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Introduction
Attitudes and evaluation are fundamental processes of 
human thought, necessary for choosing products, making 
appropriate approach and avoidance responses to stimuli, 
and even determining one’s life goals. Recent research has 
begun to decompose the neural systems involved in these 
critical processes and has suggested a widespread network 
of regions that support evaluation (see Cunningham and 
Zelazo, 2007, for a review). In particular, this research has 
indicated that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and subgen-
ual cingulate1 play an important role in the representation 
of subjective evaluation (Kringelbach, 2005), dissonance-re-
lated attitude change (J.M. Jarcho et al., submitted for pub-
lication), as well as the more general economic value or 
goal value of stimuli (Padoa-Schioppa, 2007; Tom et al., 
2007; Hare et al., 2008). Linking this activity to behavior, ac-
tivity in the OFC has been shown to relate to behavioral in-
dicators of goal value (Wallis, 2006), such as participants’ 
willingness to pay for various foods (Plassman et al., 2007). 
Specifically, whereas activity in medial OFC is typically re-
lated to representations of positive or rewarding informa-
tion, activity in lateral OFC is related to representations of 
negative or punishing information (Kringelbach and Rolls, 
2004), suggesting a possible dissociation in the processing 
of positive and negative information (Cacioppo and Bern-
tson, 1994). 
An intriguing aspect of this activation in OFC is that it 
appears to track value regardless of stimulus perceptual 
modality (e.g. food, drink, money). For example, research 
conducted on decision making in non-human primates 
has shown that neurons in the OFC code for subjective 
economic value, independent of visuospatial factors, mo-
tor responses and changes in decision context (Wallis and 
Miller, 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008). This 
pattern of data has been taken to suggest that the OFC is 
involved in translating evaluative representations (for in-
stance, from the limbic system or sensory cortex) into an 
abstracted common currency (Montague and Berns, 2002; 
Murray et al., 2007). Functionally, these cross-modal val-
uation signals allow an organism to compare the value of 
multiple stimuli during decision-making and determine, 
for example, whether satisfying a need for food, water, sex, 
money, or prestige is more important in any given situa-
tion. In this article, we extend the idea that the OFC is in-
volved in a common valuation process by demonstrating 
that the mere activation and consideration of affectively-
laden thoughts leads to OFC activity, independent of cate-
gorical differences. 
Although previous research has established the link 
between evaluation and the OFC, the paradigms used 
typically involve a decision-making situation in which 
participants determine their preference for one of two op-
tions (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2006; Tom et al., 
2007; Cunningham et al., 2009). These evaluations are 
only a small subset of the evaluative judgments that peo-
ple make each day. Humans spend much of their time 
thinking about internally generated objects and events, 
and in doing so; often determine the value of these 
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Abstract
Prior research has shown that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) plays an important role in the representation of the evaluation of stimuli, regardless 
of stimulus modality. Based on these findings, researchers have proposed that the OFC serves a common currency function, allowing for the direct 
comparison of different types of perceptual stimuli (e.g. food, drink, money). The present study was designed to extend this research and investigate 
whether these same regions of OFC that have been identified in previous research are involved in evaluating imagined stimuli. Specifically, we asked 
participants to draw on prior attitudinal knowledge to generate internal representations of liked and disliked exemplars from different categories dur-
ing functional magnetic resonance imaging. The results of this study support the idea that imagined stimuli (regardless of stimulus category) are evalu-
ated in the OFC using a common system that has been identified in previous research for externally perceived stimuli. 
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1. Studies of reward and positive hedonic states typically find activation that encompasses both the subgenual cingulate [Brodmann’s area (BA) 25] 
and an area of posterior middle orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11). For simplicity, we use the term medial OFC in this article to refer to both regions. 
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self-generated thoughts. For example, when thinking 
about a possible new car, one may consider the positive 
aspects of having the new car (e.g. better safety features) 
as well as the negative aspects (e.g. the cost). Critically, 
these evaluations can occur in the absence of any imme-
diate perceptual stimulus. Indeed, one can even evaluate 
options that do not yet exist. Thus, it seems important to 
elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying such a com-
mon feature of mental life. 
Although relatively little is known about the processes 
involved in the evaluation of self-generated stimuli, there 
is reason to believe these processes may be similar to those 
present for stimuli that come from the environment. A pro-
liferation of evidence over the last few years has demon-
strated that many brain regions that are involved in basic 
cognitive processes are also implicated in the simulation 
of similar objects and behaviors. For example, research on 
mental imagery has shown that visual cortex is involved in 
the visualization of objects (Kosslyn et al., 1995), and that 
auditory and motor imagery rely on some of the same pro-
cesses as actually hearing something or manipulating an 
object (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Furthermore, rather than imag-
ery recruiting a set of generalized perceptual processes, the 
brain appears to represent the specifics of the imagined cat-
egory as if it were receiving an externally-presented stim-
ulus. For example, when imagining faces and places, the 
fusiform face area and parahippocampal place area show 
increased activation, respectively (O’Craven and Kan-
wisher, 2000). This suggests that the mind has an amazing 
ability to conjure internal representations and then treat 
these self-generated representations as if they were pres-
ent. Thus, in the context of evaluation, it is possible that the 
mere thought of a delicious birthday cake can take on the 
same hedonic pleasure as being presented with and/or ac-
tually eating the cake. 
This possibility lies at the heart of the somatic marker 
hypothesis, which suggests that goal directed behavior is 
facilitated by an as-if loop—the mental construction of 
possible outcomes resulting from possible behaviors cou-
pled with a simulation of the affective qualities of each 
these possibilities (Damasio, 1996). By analyzing the af-
fective qualities of these possibilities, an appropriate de-
cision can be made. That is, to know whether a particular 
course of action is preferable, one needs to be able to cog-
nitively generate object representations and simulate he-
donic value. This ability to compute the value of internal 
representations is an essential component of cognitive pro-
cessing that allows for the evaluation of the potential con-
sequences of behavior without actually having to perform 
the action. Indeed, self-regulation relies on these processes, 
such as being able to determine the value of an object now 
vs later (Mischel et al., 1989; McClure et al., 2004), or decid-
ing whether an imagined end state (e.g. an athletic build) is 
worth the cost of obtaining it [e.g. going to the gym every 
day; see Trope and Liberman (2003)]. Not surprisingly, pa-
tients with OFC damage are severely impaired at making 
such judgments, and as a result, often make decisions for 
themselves that are detrimental in the long run (Bechara et 
al., 1997, 2000). 
The present study was designed to investigate whether 
the same regions of OFC that have been shown to be in-
volved in the representation of the value are involved 
when people evaluate self-generated stimuli. If the function 
of the OFC is to represent stimuli in terms of some com-
mon currency, then activation in the OFC should be similar 
for different types of stimuli, even when they are self-gen-
erated. To test this hypothesis, we adapted the procedure 
of Johnson and colleagues (2006; Packer and Cunningham, 
2009) and simply asked participants to draw on prior atti-
tudinal knowledge to generate internal representations of 
liked and disliked exemplars from different categories dur-
ing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Spe-
cifically, participants were given a prompt to generate an 
exemplar from one of three categories and consider its 
positive or negative qualities (e.g. a disliked person). This 
method provides a powerful test of our hypothesis because 
it simply involves the construction of a self-generated rep-
resentation. In contrast to most research that requires par-
ticipants to indicate which stimuli they prefer, evaluate the 
value of presented stimuli, or use an evaluation to make a 
judgment, participants are only required to select, retrieve 
and construct the representation, and do nothing with it 
other than to hold it in mind and consider its positive or 
negative aspects. 
Methods
Participants
Participants were 13 right-handed individuals (10 fe-
males) with no history of neurological problems. All partic-
ipants provided informed consent.
 
Procedure
During two runs of fMRI scanning, participants were 
asked to imagine liked and disliked exemplars from three 
different categories (i.e. objects, people and situations). 
To minimize overlap in categories, participants were pro-
vided with instructions to help refine the appropriate cat-
egories for generated exemplars (objects were to be inan-
imate, people were to be individual people, and situations 
were to be contextualized and could have multiple peo-
ple and/or objects). Participants were informed of the cat-
egories prior to entering the MRI scanner. The experiment 
had a 2 (valence: like, dislike) × 3 (category: people, situa-
tions, objects) within-subjects design. Prior to each block, 
a fixation cross appeared on the screen for 10 s. Instruc-
tions for each block appeared in the center of the screen 
for the full length of the block. Participants thought about 
the positive and negative aspects of each self-generated 
stimulus for 32 s and they did this for each type of stim-
ulus (e.g. liked person, disliked object) once during each 
block in a counterbalanced order. Thus, participants 
thought about each of the six categories twice, once in 
each of two runs, for a total of 12 blocks. Although this re-
duced the total number of trials, it helps to minimize any 
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differences in the mental states of participants that could 
vary with repeated testing, such as difficulty generating 
novel exemplars. 
fMRI scanning parameters and analysis
Participants were scanned using a Siemens 3T Tim Trio 
scanner. Functional scanning was prescribed parallel to the 
AC–PC line and nearly isotropic functional images were 
acquired from inferior to superior using a single-shot gra-
dient echo planar pulse sequence [32 axial slices; 3.5 mm 
thick; 0.5 mm skip; echo time (TE) = 25 ms; retention time 
(TR) = 2000 ms; in-plane resolution = 3.5 × 3.5 mm; matrix 
size = 64 × 64; field of view = 224 mm). These parameters 
provided excellent coverage of OFC for all participants. 
Following functional imaging, a high resolution MPRAGE 
anatomical image (176 sagittal slices; TE = 2.15 ms; TR = 
1760 ms; resolution = 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm) was collected for 
normalization. 
Data were prepared for analysis using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Data 
were corrected for slice acquisition time and motion, co-
registered to structural images, transformed to conform to 
the default T1 Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) brain 
interpolated to 3 × 3 × 3 mm3, and smoothed using an 9 
mm FWHM (full-width-half-maximum) kernel. Data were 
analyzed using the general linear model in SPM8. The 
BOLD signal was modeled as a function of a canonical he-
modynamic response function and its temporal derivative 
with a 160 s high-pass filter. 
Using the general linear model as implemented by 
SPM8, individual level (first level) effects were estimated 
by convolving a boxcar hemodynamic response function 
against the preprocessed data for each of the six experi-
mental conditions (e.g. liked people, disliked situations). 
The resulting contrast maps were submitted to a 2 (va-
lence) × 3 (category) repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA). Orthogonal contrasts were estimated to 
test the main effects of valence and category, as well as 
the valence-by-category interaction. Effects are reported 
as statistically significant if they exceeded P < 0.001 (un-
corrected) with at least 20 contiguous voxels. For valence 
effects, directional contrasts (e.g. positive > negative) 
were computed for each of the three categories and sub-
jected to a conjunction analysis to determine whether ob-
served effects were found in each of the three conditions. 
To establish category specific effects, a conjunction anal-
ysis was run using contrasts between one category and 
the other two [i.e. (people > objects) and (people > situ-
ations)]. Regions are only discussed as valence or cate-
gory specific if found in both the ANOVA main effect at 
P < 0.001 (with at least 20 contiguous voxels) and in the 
conjunction analysis at P < 0.05 (a joint probability of P 
< 0.000125). Although P < 0.05 was our a priori cutoff for 
the conjunction analyses, it should be noted that all re-
ported effects in the text also survived a conjunction anal-
ysis of P < 0.01 (a joint probability of P < 0.000001). 
Results
Main effects of category
To ensure that participants were performing the task as 
instructed, we first examined whether different categories 
of stimuli (i.e. people, situations and objects) led to activa-
tion in neural networks associated with these categories 
(see Table 1). As predicted, we observed greater activa-
tion in the medial area of superior prefrontal cortex (BA 9; 
F2,24 = 11.88, P < 0.001; Figure 1) when participants thought 
about people as compared with objects and situations. 
In contrast, areas of inferior temporal lobe (F2,24 = 32.43, 
P < 0.001), motor cortex (F2,24 = 29.20, P < .001), and infe-
rior frontal cortex (BA 45; F2,24 = 25.72, P < 0.001) showed 
greater activation to objects relative to social stimuli (i.e. 
people, situations). These data are consistent with previ-
ous research showing that these regions differentiate ‘so-
cial cognition’ from ‘object cognition’ (e.g. Newman et al., 
Table 1. Main effects of category
Region                                       BA   Side  Voxels    F         X        Y       Z
ANOVA results
   Medial superior frontal  10  R  161  11.88  6  60  15
   Medial superior frontal  9/10  R   11.58  9  51  27
   Medial superior frontal  9  R   9.58  3  48  39
   Middle orbitofrontal  11  R  361  24.54  3  54  –12
   Precuneus  23  R  419  27.60  3  –57  27
   Posterior cingulate  23  L  122  13.55  –3  –42  51
   Inferior temporal  37  L  584  32.43  –51  –57  –6
   Inferior frontal  48  L  201  25.72  –42  30  15
   Inferior frontal/pars triangularis  45  R  39  12.59  42  36  9
   Middle frontal  8  L  128  16.11  –27  6  54
   Middle temporal  22  L  41  12.17  –60  –9  –9
   Middle temporal  20  R  47  11.93  54  –12  –18
   Precentral gyrus  6  L  246  29.2  –48  0  24
   Precentral gyrus  6  L   10.55  –30  –9  51
   Superior parietal  7  L  533  26.08  –21  –72  42
   Middle occipital  39  R  21  9.93  54  –69  27
Conjunction results
(Objects > people) and (objects > situations)
   Inferior temporal lobe  37  L  1138  6.47  –48  –57  –6
   Superior parietal  19  L  1036  6.11  –18  –72  42
   Precentral gyrus  6  L  914  5.97  –48  0  24
   Middle frontal  8  L  318  4.81  –27  6  54
   Superior motor area  6  L  2.07  –6  3  48
   Inferior frontal/pars triangularis  45  R  209  3.93  45  39  6
(People > objects) and (people > situations)
   Medial superior frontal  9  R  681  3.80  3  48  39
   Superior temporal sulcus  20  R  58  3.45  60  –12  –21
   Superior temporal sulcus  21  L  23  2.41  –63  –12  –15
   Rectus gyrus  11  –  288  3.16  0  42  –21
   Precuneus  23  R  129  2.87  3  –60  24
(Situations > people) and (situations > objects)
   Angular gyrus  39  L  278  3.42  –51  –57  27
   Middle temporal gyrus  37  R  228  3.14  48  –63  12
   Precuneus  23  R  17  2.14  18  –57  42
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2005; Mitchell, 2006, 2009). Although the conjunction anal-
ysis for situations (relative to people and objects) revealed 
areas specific to situations (Table 1), the activation for these 
regions was not predicted a priori. Because situations are 
often social (and may include people), we computed an 
additional conjunction analysis comparing [(people > ob-
jects) and (situations > objects)]. This analysis indicated the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (t12 = 5.05, P < 0.01; MNI: 
6, 57, −6) and precuneus (t12 = 5.26, P < 0.01; MNI: 6, −57, 
27) were more active for people and situations than objects. 
Thus, it appears that people and situations recruited a sim-
ilar network of brain regions, although the dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex was active only when thinking specifi-
cally about individual people. 
Main effects of valence
We then examined whether liked and disliked self-gen-
erated stimuli led to activity in the medial and lateral OFC, 
respectively (see Table 2 for a full set of results). As pre-
dicted, areas of medial OFC (BA 11: F1,12 = 23.98, P < 0.001) 
and subgenual cingulate (BA 25: F1,12 = 25.53, P < 0.001) 
showed greater activation to imagined liked exemplars 
than imagined disliked exemplars in both the main effects 
Figure 1. Main effects of category: (a–c) Conjunction results overlaid on the default MNI template, (a) people > (objects and situations), 
(b) objects > (people and situations), (c) situations > (people and objects). (d) Mean activation for each condition in the dorsal medial PFC. 
(e) Mean activation for each condition in the motor cortex. (f) Mean activation for each condition in the inferior temporal lobe. (g) Mean 
activation for each condition in the angular gyrus. 
Table 2. Main effects of valence
Region                                     BA    Side  Voxels     F        X        Y         Z
ANOVA results
   Subgenual cingulate  25  L  363  25.53  –6  33  9
   Middle OFC  11  R   23.98  3  39  –6
   Insula/inferior frontal (LOFC)  47  L  45  28.19  –30  21  –12
   Precentral gyrus  6  R  64  19.91  45  –6  45
   Middle temporal  39  R  74  18.41  48  –69  24
   Cerebellum  n/a  R  109  30.85  24  –75  –36
Conjunction results
Liked > Disliked
   Anterior cingulate  24  L  480  3.33  –3  33  12
   Subgenual cingulate  25  L   3.00  –3  42  6
   Middle OFC  11  L   2.79  –12  54  6
   Precentral gyrus  6  R  106  2.53  48  0  39
   Angular gyrus  39  R  53  2.31  54  –72  24
Disliked > Liked
   Insula/inferior frontal (LOFC)  47  L  57  3.42  –30  21  –15
   Superior frontal OFC  11  L  16  2.48  –21  54  –6
   Cerebellum  n/a  R  179  3.38  24  –75  –36
   Fusiform gyrus  18  L  111  2.61  –24  –75  –12
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ANOVA and conjunction analyses. The difference be-
tween liked and disliked exemplars was similar for each of 
the three thought type conditions and there was no interac-
tion between thought type and valence (Figure 2). Further-
more, we observed a region of left lateral OFC/insula (BA 
47: F1,12 = 28.19, P < 0.001) that was more active to disliked 
than liked objects (Figure 3). An additional region of lateral 
OFC (BA 11) was identified in the conjunction analysis that 
showed greater activation for disliked than liked exem-
plars (t12 = 2.48, P < 0.01) that was only marginally signifi-
cant (P < 0.005) in the ANOVA using our a priori criterion. 
As with the medial OFC, this difference in activation for 
disliked compared with liked representations was found 
for each of the three thought types and there was no inter-
action of thought type by valence. This pattern of data is 
consistent with work showing a medial/lateral distinction 
in OFC activity, with lateral regions being associated with 
the monitoring of potential punishers and medial regions 
being associated with representing the value of potential 
rewards. Lowering the threshold to P < 0.005 or decreasing 
the cluster size threshold did not result in additional mean-
ingful activations. 
Although these results are consistent with the idea 
that the same areas of medial and lateral OFC are in-
volved in the representation of positive and negative 
valence for self-generated stimuli as for externally pre-
sented stimuli, without a within-subjects conjunction 
these analyses cannot determine conclusively whether 
the same regions are involved. To provide additional 
support for our hypothesis, we conducted secondary 
analyses of medial and lateral OFC using regions ex-
tracted from a study in which participants responded 
to gambles and received rewards and punishments as a 
function of their behavior (Cunningham et al., 2009). This 
particular study was selected because the coordinates 
for reward and punishment were similar to other rein-
forcement studies and because the data was collected on 
the same Siemens 3T Tim Trio scanner. Region of inter-
est masks were defined as 6 mm spheres around MNI: 
12, 48, −6 for medial OFC and MNI: −30, 27, 0 for lat-
eral OFC. Replicating the primary results of this study, 
greater medial OFC activation was found for liked than 
disliked exemplars (F1,12 = 6.81, P < 0.05) and greater lat-
eral OFC activation was found for disliked than liked 
Figure 2. Main effects of valence: (a) ANOVA results for main effects of valence in medial OFC, (b) conjunction analysis for liked objects, 
people and situations (> disliked objects, people and situations; red = P < 0.05, yellow = P < 0.01), and (c) mean activation for each condi-
tion in the medial OFC. 
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exemplars (F1,12 = 5.17, P < .05), and there were no inter-
actions of valence and category for either medial (F2,24 = 
0.02, P = .983) or lateral OFC (F2,24 = 0.19, P < 0.83). 
Interaction effects
At the a priori thresholds, we found no interactions 
between valence and category in any of our whole brain 
analyses. However, because of our relatively small sam-
ple size, it is possible that effects existed below our rel-
atively conservative thresholds. To test for this possibil-
ity, we dropped our statistical threshold to P < 0.01. At 
this very liberal threshold, we found eight clusters that 
had significant interactions with cluster sizes greater 
than 10 contiguous voxels. However, plotting of each of 
these effects did not reveal any theoretically meaningful 
or readily interpretable patterns. Thus, these results sug-
gest that although activation of the category represen-
tations involved distinct brain regions, when it came to 
the representation of evaluation, a common network was 
used. 
Nucleus accumbens and amygdala
In addition to OFC, research on evaluation has suggested 
that limbic areas are often involved when needing to make 
predictions about stimuli. Specifically, regions of nucleus 
accumbens (Nacc) and amygdala often are found in stud-
ies when participants need to retrieve information regard-
ing the value of a presented stimulus (see Cunningham and 
Zelazo, 2007 for a review). Interestingly, neither of these re-
gions was found in our primary analyses when participants 
self-generated liked and disliked exemplars. To examine 
these regions more closely, data for each condition was ex-
tracted from 6mm spheres around right and left Nacc (MNI: 
±9, 21, −3) and amygdala (MNI: ±24, −3, −18). Consistent 
with research showing that Nacc is associated with reward 
processing, results indicated that right Nacc (±9, 21, −3) 
showed greater activation to liked than disliked stimuli (F1,12 
= 9.95, P < 0.01). Left Nacc showed a similar effect, though 
only at marginal levels of significance (F1,12 = 4.67, P = 0.052). 
No effects of valence were found for either right (F1,12 = 1.45, 
P = 0.252) or left amygdala (F1,12 = 0.70, P = 0.418). 
Figure 3. Main effects of valence: (a) ANOVA results for main effects of valence in lateral OFC, (b) conjunction analysis for disliked ob-
jects, people and situations (> liked objects, people and situations; blue = P < 0.05, light blue = P < 0.01), (c) mean activation for each con-
dition in the lateral OFC (BA 47) and (d) lateral OFC (BA 11). 
292 c u n n i n g h a m ,  J O h n s e n  a n d  W a g g O n e r  i n  S o c i a l  c o g n i t i v e  a n d  a f f e c t i v e  n e u r o S c i e n c e  6  (2011) 
Discussion
The evaluation of our cognitive representations is cru-
cial for adaptive behavior, as it allows us to make decisions 
about the hedonic value of a stimulus. Importantly, people 
are able to engage in mental simulation in the absence of 
any visually presented stimulus. This ability allows us to 
plan for the future, anticipate affective outcomes, evaluate 
objects in terms of their relevance to our goals, and engage 
in goal-directed action. The present research extends prior 
work by showing that the valence of imagined stimuli may 
be represented in largely the same way as the valence of 
observed stimuli, and by elucidating the brain systems that 
may provide the mechanism by which this is possible. Spe-
cifically, the results of this study show that the OFC is in-
volved in representation of evaluation regardless of stim-
ulus modality, and that this is true for imagined stimuli. 
Thus, it is possible that once representations are active (re-
gardless of source), a common network is involved in eval-
uation and generation of affective responses. 
Specifically, we found evidence that the medial OFC 
was involved in the representation or processing of imag-
ined liked stimuli, while areas of lateral OFC/insula were 
involved in the representation/processing of imagined dis-
liked stimuli. Interestingly, these regions did not overlap 
with the regions associated with the processing of different 
stimulus categories (i.e. people, situations, objects) suggest-
ing that (i) people were activating different categories of 
stimuli, and, critically, (ii) despite the differences in exem-
plar generation, the same neural systems differentiated the 
valence of the exemplar. This suggests that although mul-
tiple brain systems retrieve and process different types of 
stimuli (e.g. areas related to social cognition for imagining 
people), a single system is used for representing the affec-
tive meaning of the stimulus. Just as visual, auditory and 
somatosensory information is processed through a com-
mon affective system (the system that is also involved in 
the processing of sensory information), so too are self-gen-
erated evaluative representations despite any differences 
in retrieval. 
This study also contributes to an understanding of the 
deficits found in patients with OFC damage. Compared 
with controls, OFC patients have difficulty with various 
adaptive behaviors, such as postponing immediate re-
wards in order to gain more abstracted future rewards, 
learning to update their behavior when stimulus-response 
outcome contingences have changed (Bechara et al., 1996), 
and many other decision making deficits associated with 
the representation of value and social behavior (Beer et 
al., 2006; see Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; Wallis, 2007 for 
reviews). To determine the locus of the problem, recent 
work by Fellows and Farah (2007) has suggested that these 
deficits in decision making among OFC patients stem from 
an inability to form stable representations of preferences, 
rather than a deficit in decision-making per se. They have 
demonstrated that OFC patients make inconsistent pref-
erence judgments even in the absence of a decision-mak-
ing task. Our data support this conclusion—in our task, 
participants were not asked to do anything other than to 
hold the representation in mind and consider its positives 
and negatives. Indeed, participants were not required to 
make any response whatsoever. Because there was no pre-
sented stimulus, and no required response, this pattern of 
results further bolsters the idea that the OFC is involved 
in representing evaluations and may provide a cross-
modal representation of value, here even for stimuli that 
were merely imagined. Thus, providing additional sup-
port for the Fellows and Farah (2007) hypothesis that OFC 
is involved in valuation, and not judgment per se, our data 
suggest that the OFC appears to be responsible for repre-
senting the evaluation of all stimuli (e.g. person or place, 
real or imagined) as a common currency, which then al-
lows one to make informed decisions. When this region is 
damaged, decision-making becomes impaired, likely be-
cause individuals are no longer able to make reasonable 
comparisons between different options and possible out-
comes (e.g. present vs absent, concrete vs abstract, mone-
tary vs affective). 
The representation of positive and negative affect is in-
tertwined with our goals and desired outcomes. Just as 
goals can shape evaluations (i.e. Cunningham et al., 2005, 
2008; S.M. Mowrer et al., manuscript in preparation), our 
evaluative processes serve the development and main-
tenance of our goal states. Part of goal-directed behav-
ior involves the representation of possible hypothetical 
outcomes, the methods by which we can achieve these out-
comes, and our progress toward various goals. Thus, by 
simulating the affective consequences of possible courses 
of action, we can determine whether a goal is worth having 
and pursuing. As such, it should not be surprising that the 
act of retrieving certain goals activates the same medial re-
gion of OFC found in the present research. Indeed, research 
on self-reflection, a process that is likely goal directed, of-
ten finds activity in medial areas of PFC (Kelley et al., 2002; 
Ochsner et al., 2004). Using a similar paradigm to the one 
used in the present research, Johnson and colleagues (2006) 
and Packer and Cunningham (2009) observed greater me-
dial OFC activation when participants engaged in self-re-
flection regarding their goals and evaluated their progress. 
However, what is particularly interesting was that not all 
goals activated this region. Specifically, increased activa-
tion was found only for promotion-focused goals and not 
prevention-focused goals despite the fact that these goals 
were presumably equally self-relevant. In contrast with 
prevention goals, which concern one’s responsibilities, du-
ties and obligations, promotion goals concern achievement, 
opportunities and accomplishments—aspects that specif-
ically concern gaining positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997, 
2000). When considering the possible explanations for their 
findings, Johnson and colleagues (2006) noted that the pos-
itive valence of promotion-focused goals may have contrib-
uted to their effect. Thus, given the self-enhancing biases 
that are prevalent in our society, a large question remains 
for the neuroscience community: are areas of medial OFC 
active when people process reward-related information be-
cause it is deemed to be more self-relevant, or do we see 
self processes recruiting these regions because thinking of 
the self recruits positive hedonic biases? 
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